Say “community” today, and the image that comes to mind isn’t exactly flattering: a cult, identity-based withdrawal, communitarianism held up as a bogeyman in public debate. The word strikes fear, or at best raises a smile, as if tainted by nostalgia. This mistrust isn’t unfounded: closed and oppressive communities have existed, and still do. But it isn’t the community itself that’s the problem—it’s which common we’re talking about, and in what form we build it.
The word “common” comes from the Latin cum munus: that which comes with a burden, with a shared obligation. The Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito shows that this munus is less a good that we possess together than a debt, an exposure to the other—the opposite of a property that we would protect behind a border. The common is that which belongs to no one as their own, that which begins where the proper ends. We can gauge the difference with Elinor Ostrom’s “commons,” often invoked today: resources shared by a defined group, which excludes others. The common in question here is not a better-managed asset, but that which cannot be appropriated—what Dardot and Laval call the “inappropriable.” This detour overturns our spontaneous intuition: communitarian withdrawal is not an excess of the common; it is the exact opposite. Esposito calls this immunity: the mechanism by which a group closes in on itself, shielding itself from exposure to the other. A community walled off within its own identity does not have too much of the common: it has shielded itself from it. Communitarianism is thus a defense against the common, not its overflow.
We must not fall into the opposite naivety: not every community is, by nature, good, egalitarian, or emancipatory. Murray Bookchin forcefully reminded us: decentralization and mutual aid are not in themselves guarantees of emancipation—European feudalism, though decentralized, was among the most hierarchical societies in history (see our entry Mutual Aid). A community can practice internal solidarity while oppressing some of its own members, or define itself in opposition to an “outside” designated as a threat. The problem, therefore, is not a choice between community and society, as Tönnies frames it—warmth lost on one side, cold modernity on the other (Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft). Gustav Landauer rejected this dichotomy: the two are not irreconcilable essences. What must be examined is the form of a community—open or closed, deliberating or ossified—not its existence.
There remains the oldest question—and the most decisive one for those who fear that the common will crush the individual. Heraclitus, twenty-five centuries ago, already posed it in the clearest terms:
“For those who are awake, there is one and common world. Whereas among those who sleep, each turns away from it toward his own.”
The common (koinon) lies on the side of shared lucidity; withdrawal into one’s own world (idios—the root of the word “idiot”) lies on the side of sleep. It is not individuality that stands opposed to the common; it is drowsiness, self-enclosure, that cuts one off from the shared world.
Twenty-five centuries later, Jean-Luc Nancy takes up this insight: against the nostalgia for a fusional community where individualities would dissolve into a great Whole, he shows that existence is, from the outset, coexistence—the singular and the plural determine one another from the beginning, without either being primary. Marx, in The German Ideology, expressed the same conviction from an entirely different tradition: “It is only within the community that the means exist for each individual to cultivate his or her faculties in every respect; it is therefore only within the community that personal freedom becomes possible.” Three voices, three eras, one and the same demand: the common is not what threatens individual freedom; it is its very condition—capitalist individualism, on the other hand, exists only in separation.
That leaves the most concrete of the three terms—and the most misunderstood. The word “commune”—in French, the basic unit of local government—first brings to mind the town hall, the municipal council, and the road budget voted once a year. That is not what is at issue here. Kropotkin had already responded to the objection: you want to take us back to the Middle Ages. His response distinguishes between two types of communes: the medieval commune freed itself from the lord only to immediately shut itself behind its walls, indifferent to neighboring serfs; the commune that communalism aspires to frees itself from the state in order to expand, federate, and become universal. It is this commune—a political cell, not an administrative level; a place where all aspects of communal life, including production, are decided; a neighborhood assembly based on direct democracy, not an administered local government—that opens up the entire communalist architecture: an imperative and recallable mandate, stateless confederalism. This architecture alone would merit several entries; here we will limit ourselves to the foundational distinction: no longer confusing the commune we endure with the one we inhabit and institute.
Three words, a single gesture: the common as a shared burden rather than closed property; community as a social bond always to be built, free from both fusional nostalgia and the fear of withdrawal; the commune as its political form, the assembly where decisions are made together without dissolving anyone. And perhaps, at its core, even more than that. William Morris, who saw in the commune the very model of a society to be rebuilt, stated it plainly: “The true secret of happiness lies in taking an interest in all the details of daily life.” Making the common without crushing the one—perhaps that is what it really comes down to: not a shared renunciation, but a shared attention to what, from the most minute to the most vital, is never experienced alone.
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